Tomoji Shogenji
Academic Background
B.A., University of Tokyo
M.A., University of Tokyo
Ph.D., University of Southern California
Courses Taught
FYS 100: Self, Mind, Heart in Eastern Philosophies
PHIL 200: Introduction to Philosophy
PHIL 220: Logic and Probability in Scientific Reasoning
PHIL 305: Intermediate Logic
PHIL 311: Knowledge and Truth
PHIL 320: Philosophy of Science
PHIL 330: Metaphysics
PHIL 333: Philosophy of Mind
Specializations
Epistemology
Philosophy of Science
Publication (Book)
Formal Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism: In Defense of Belief in the Natural World, Routledge (forthcoming)
Publication (Papers):
32. “A Unified Account of the Conjunction Fallacy by Coherence” (with Martin Jönsson), Synthese (forthcoming)
31. “Information and Inaccuracy” (with William Roche), The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming).
30. “Mediated Confirmation,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2017), 847-874.
29. “Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts” (with Luca Moretti) International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2017), 1-25.
28. “Confirmation, Transitivity, and Moore: The Screening-Off Approach” (with William Roche), Philosophical Studies 168 (2014), 797-817.
27. “Dwindling Confirmation” (with William Roche), Philosophy of Science 81 (2014), 114-137.
26. “Coherence of the Contents and the Transmission of Probabilistic Support,” Synthese 190 (2013), 2525-2545.
25. “Reductio, Coherence, and the Myth of Epistemic Circularity” in F. Zenker, ed., Bayesian Argumentation (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 165-184.
24. “Internalism and Externalism in Meliorative Epistemology,” Erkenntnis 76 (2012), 59-72.
23. “The Degree of Epistemic Justification and the Conjunction Fallacy,” Synthese 184 (2012), 29-48.
22. Review of Against Coherence: Truth, Probability and Justification (Erik Olsson). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 1 (2008), 292-296.
21. “Why Does Coherence Appear Truth Conducive?” Synthese 157: 3 (2007), 361-372.
20. Review of Bayesian Epistemology (Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann). Theoria (Sweden) 72 (2006), 166-171.
19. “A Defense of Reductionism about Testimonial Justification of Beliefs,” Noûs 40 (2006), 331-346.
18. “The Role of Coherence of Evidence in the Non-Dynamic Model of Confirmation,” Erkenntnis 63 (2005), 317-333.
17. “Justification by Coherence from Scratch,” Philosophical Studies 125 (2005), 305-325.
16. “Can We Trust Our Memories? C. I. Lewis’s Coherence Argument” (with Erik J. Olsson), Synthese 142: 1 (2004), 21-41.
15. “A Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003), 613-616.
14. “The Problem of Independence in Justification by Coherence” in Y. Bouchard,ed., Perspectives on Coherentism (Alymer: Éditions du Scribe, 2002),129-137.
13. “Reply to Akiba on the Probabilistic Measure of Coherence,” Analysis 61 (2001), 147-150.
12. “The Role of Coherence in Epistemic Justification,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001), 90-106.
11. “Self-Dependent Justification without Circularity,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2000), 287-298.
10. “The Problem of the Criterion in Rule-Following,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000), 501-525.
9. “Is Coherence Truth Conducive?” Analysis 59 (1999), 338-345.
8. “The Consistency of Global Relativism,” Mind 106 (1997), 745-747.
7. Translation of John Searle, Intentionality, Chapter 6 “Meaning” in Japanese in Hyakudai Sakamoto (ed.), Shikousei [Intentionality], (Tokyo: Seishin Publishers, 1997).
6. “Ninshikironteki Junkan” [Epistemic Circularity] in Japanese, Tetsugaku Zasshi (Journal of Philosophy) 111 (1996), 85-102.
5. “Kisoku Ni Shitagau” [To Follow a Rule] in Japanese in Takashi Iida (ed.), Wittgenstein Tokuhon [Wittgenstein Companion] (Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 1995).
4. “The Problem of Rule-Following in Compositional Semantics,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 73 (1995), 97-108.
3. “Modest Scepticism about Rule-Following,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1993), 486-500.
2. “Boomerang Defense of Rule Following,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1992), 115-122.
1. “To Borrow a Rule” in Ronshu [Philosophical Studies], Vol. 3 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, Department of Philosophy, 1985), 1-12.
